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巻頭言

会長をお引き受けして

朝倉幹夫

私自身がいっこう自信が持てないという雰囲気の中で、又平成元年になって間もない時にご推挙を得ましてG. F. 中部同窓会長ということになったわけですが、まだ実感がわからないのでございます。長い昭和の御世が終わり、平成元年になったが、愛知から海部首相誕生、又市制百周年記念世界デザイン博は昭和の集大成となった感がある。東京—大阪間リニアが完成し、中部新空港が出来ると、名古屋は文字通り日本の中核となる。昭和の集大成と二十一世紀への夢を同時進行させた今年は名古屋にとって忘れられない年になるう。

さてG. F. 総会及び例会は名残惜しいような会合こそが理想ではないかと思っています。お互いに声を掛け合い、関心を分け合う。時には個人的な愚痴や相談もする。気がむけば夜の方の親睦もはかる。そうした積み重ねが相互理解につながります。職業分野ではサミットに近い方々ばかりですので、他の職では分からない各種職業人としての考え方を出しあってお互い切磋琢磨していきたいと思います。私はG. F. 生として米国の有名な人達の所で勉強出来たお陰で、ひょっとした国際医学会が縁でワルシャワ大学客員教授になり、ポーランドを5～6回訪れまして当地の社会環境を肌で感じてきました。その後ロータリークラブや諸財団にポーランドへの医療援助を働きかけてきましたが、社会主義國、ココム等々の理由で関心を示されませんでしたので残念でした。歲月人を待たず、最近のソ連・東欧情勢はこの11月に入ってから全く一変しました。G. F. プログラムで受けた恩恵を終生忘れないと同様に、今これら困っている社会主義國の人達に積極的な支援を差し伸べるべきと思います。先日来日されたレーガン元大統領も特に日本へのそうした期待を表明されたと聞いて居ます。

ロータリークラブで誰かがおっしゃった言葉が私の脳裡にやきついています。それは「他に憎悪を抱く」—他の人に憎しみを抱くことよりもほかのことに無関心であることの方が怖い。つまり、憎しみを持つことは他に関心を以ているからで、無関心なものには憎しみさえも持てない。そういう無関心さが実は大変怖いのであると。

米国の善意により始められたこのG. F. 交換学生は日本を始め、世界中にたくさん居ります。フルブライト自身及びアマコスト米駐日大使もそのお一人で、若い頃、ドイツで勉強されたともうけたまわって居ります。私はこの得難いG. F. 法による管理された米国留学という経験を生かして各界で活躍していられます諸先輩に負けない様、日米両国の為は勿論、世界平和に為、最後まで努力したいと思っています。

本同窓会の目的、楽しさというものを味わうためにも、いろんな会員の皆様のご協力をお願いし、細目にわたっては長坂前会長、及び現役員のお知恵を借り乍ら頑張りたいと思っております。

(ガリオア・フルブライト中部同窓会会長)

雑感

中部同窓会に入れて戴いて

堀江 昭

昭和二十年、横浜は焼け野原であった。山下公園に行くと、米軍の水兵が、さっそうとモーターボートを走らせていた。あの海の向うアメリカという豊かな国があると思うと、十六歳の私は、何としてでもアメリカに行こうと決心した。そして、昭和二十七年幸いにも、ガリオア留学生試験に合格し、夢に見た憧れの国に渡ったのである。

この留学のおかげで、その後海外勤務も出来、子供が三人ともニューヨーク生まれということにもなりアメリカとの御縁は大変深いものとなった。

そんな事情から東京在勤時代はガリオア・フルブライト同窓会の活動にも積極的に参加してきた。一昨年、名古屋へ転勤する時も「名古屋へ行ったら同窓会の活動を積極的にやってみて下さい」と言われてきたし、自分としても何かお役に立ちたいと思っている次第である。

私の勤務している会社では、名古屋での仕事は国内取引が中心であるため、外国人のひとと直接話す機会が少ないので、同窓会で例会の度に外国人の先生をおよびして話をきいたり、外国人に接する機会を作って戴いて感謝している。

そして会合もただ講演会だけでは懇親の機会もないので、前回から私の親しくしているキリンビールさんにビールを寄付して戴き、毎回みんなで一杯やれる様にしたが、これは成功だと思う。

今後は、同窓会の皆さんに是非気楽に総会や例会に出席戴き、皆さんからもアイデアを出して戴き、懇親の輪を拡げて行きたいと思っている。

(中部同窓会副会長、三菱商事(株)名古屋支社)

My Japan Experiences as a Fulbrighter

David Flath

Professor Kinoshita has asked me to write something for the Chubu Fulbright newsletter and I am happy to respond. As a Fulbright exchange professor (1984-1985) I taught economics classes at Nagoya University and Nanzan University. This was my second visit to Japan. The first was in the fall of 1981 under the auspices of the newly-founded North Carolina Japan Center. The Center was established in order to promote academic and cultural exchanges between North Carolina and Japan. Its staff now consists of a director, associate director, Japanese language teacher, and two or three secretaries, all of whom are housed in a building near the campus of North Carolina State University in Raleigh, North Carolina. Because of my association with the Center I was privileged to receive Japanese language training and time away from other responsibilities in order to gain expertise on aspects of Japan related to my speciality of economics. These experiences had been most pleasurable. I was therefore extremely grateful for the chance to further extend my knowledge of Japan as a Fulbrighter. The opportunity to come to Japan as a teacher at two fine universities--Nagoya University and Nanzan University--would probably have been impossible for me except for the Fulbright program. I am doubly grateful for many kindnesses I received from the staffs of these universities, many of whom are Fulbright alumni.

Since returning to North Carolina I have used the knowledge acquired as a Fulbrighter to good effect. I have developed a new course for undergraduate students on the Japanese economy and have continued several academic research projects begun while in Japan and focusing on Japan. I have also been pleased to receive several Japanese visitors, including some whom I met while in Nagoya. Thus my Japan experiences are even now continuing.

(Professor of Economics, North Carolina State University)

報告

1. 総会記録

平成元年度の中部同窓会総会は、6月22日午後6時30分より名古屋アメリカン・センターの会議室で、会員約20名の出席をえて開催された。

はじめに、本年4月、長坂源一郎氏の後を継いで新会長になられた朝倉幹夫氏の挨拶があり、ついで、総会議長に上田慶一氏を選出して議事を進めた。議事の内容は、以下の通り。

1. 監査選任の件：石川進氏に代わって篠田啓一氏が選ばれた。
2. 新役員の内：会長の交替に伴って役員の一部にも異動があり、紹介された。新役員の名簿は別記の通り。
3. 昭和63年度の事業報告の件：会員名簿の作成等の報告があった。
4. 昭和63年度12月総会以降の会計報告と監査報告の件：いずれも承認された。
5. 平成元年度の事業計画の件：会員名簿の作成、ニュース・レターの発行等の計画案の説明があり、承認された。
6. 平成元年度予算案の件：原案通り承認された。
7. 名誉会員の件：中部同窓会は例会その他でアメリカン・センターにお世話になっているので、会則第4条と5条を変更して、名誉会員制度を設け、センターの館長と副館長を名誉会員にしてはどうかとの提案があり、承認された。併せて名誉会員からは会費を戴かないことを承認した。

総会終了後、フルブライト交換教授として南山大学にきておられるW. ピケットさんのスピーチ（内容は本ニュース・レターに所収）を聞き、天皇問題をめぐるホットなディスカッションがおこなわれた。引き続き、ビュッヘ・スタイルの懇親会に移り、ビールを飲みながら歓談し、散会した。

2. 平成元年度の役員

会 長： 朝倉幹夫（1953年ガリオア、ニューナゴヤ・クリニック）

副会長： 堀江 昭（1952年ガリオア、三菱商事）
 岩野一郎（1964年フルブライト、南山大学）
 幹事： 木下宗七（1973年フルブライト、名古屋大学）
 千田純一（1974年フルブライト、名古屋大学）
 上田慶一（1963年フルブライト、三重県中勢教育事務所）
 大石秀夫（1966年フルブライト、三菱自動車）
 監査： 篠田啓一（1960年フルブライト、名古屋国際センター）

注：括弧の中は渡米年次と勤務先を表す。

3. 昭和63年度決算（昭和63年12月－平成元年5月）

総会で承認された決算内容は次の通り。

収入の部	前期繰越	105,288	
	立替金	20,000	前会長
	総会会費	12,000	
	年会費	258,000	86人分
	利息	211	
	合計	395,499	
支出の部	総会費用	41,790	
	返済金	191,632	南山大学、前会長
	通信費	17,511	
	ゴム印	1,854	
	合計	252,787	
次期繰越		142,712	

注：総会開催日時の関係で決算の期間が変則的になりましたが、平成元年度より
 会則通り3月末日に戻しますので、ご了承ください。

Guest Speech

The Showa Emperor and World War II: The View of American Historians

William B. Pickett

The death of the Showa emperor in January of this year brought summaries of his life in the news media. Some of them asserted that he was to blame for Japanese aggression leading to World War II. Such stories were particularly numerous in Britain and in the Asian lands occupied by Japan in the 1930s and 40s. But even in the United States, magazine and television accounts of the Showa era featured Hirohito in military uniform on a white horse reviewing troops. They also told the story of the emperor's intervention to end the war after the atomic explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and Soviet declaration of war on Japan. The emperor in statements to General MacArthur, they pointed out, had accepted responsibility for Japan's actions and the new constitution stripped him of all state authority. It was thus perhaps logical to conclude that he bore major, perhaps final blame for the aggression carried out in his name. Alas, the truth is not so simple. Evidence now available to American historians reveals that, while he was a close observer of these events, even a ceremonial participant, his responsibility was small.

The misunderstanding arises from several sources. One, of course, is the effort by newsmen to attract readers. Another is the fact that history is usually complicated, events having many causes. The issue of imperial responsibility accordingly is part of a continuing debate about the causes of World War II. International conflicts in the twentieth century were caused at least in part by failure of the international community to take timely action. The United States in 1898, for instance, moved to achieve independence for the Cuban people through military action despite the fact that Spain had virtually conceded American demands. Sensationalist newspapers stirred the public to a

virtual hysteria, pushing the nation to war and no other nation or group of nations was willing to intervene. And while Hitler used military force against Czechoslovakia, then Poland and the low countries, war occurred in 1939 also because the international community stood aloof, economic disorder and isolationism eradicating sentiments of international responsibility in Britain, France and the United States. In America's war with Spain, Admiral Dewey sank the Spanish fleet in Manila bay as Britain, Russia, France, and Japan stood by and then the U.S. annexed the Philippines. In 1938, western appeasement of the German and Italian dictators at the Munich conference turned over to Hitler the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. Similarly, Japanese leaders were responsible for aggression in Manchuria, China and at Pearl Harbor. But even their blame is shared by the nations, including the United States, that tolerated Japanese expansion on the Asian continent and then imposed economic sanctions while refusing to seek a modus vivendi with Japan.

Finally, part of the misunderstanding lies in confusion about the extent to which the emperor was Japan's leader. The word emperor would seem to imply leadership, a very large degree of it in fact. Americans and Europeans are accustomed to defining "emperor" as an individual in whom resides unrestricted authority. What may, perhaps most observers have failed to see is that the Japanese concept stems from a mystical, familial, hierarchical, and religious (Hirohito became a *arahitogami*, or living god at age 27) tradition in contrast to the western rationalist, legalistic view of rule as direct immediate control. In European and American history national leaders--whether presidents, prime ministers, kings, or dictators--have had varying amounts of freedom but all have controlled in some way the day-to-day lives of their countrymen and often especially during emergencies personally directed their nations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, carried out duties for which he was accountable to the voters. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, however, embodying sovereignty in themselves, were accountable to no one. Unlike even

the powerful Hapsburg and Romanov monarchies, they gained mastery of their people through their party, secret police, and control over the economy, military, and communications.

Given Japan's membership in the Axis alliance with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy and the fact that the emperor was the man in whose name all actions were taken, it is not surprising that journalists and historians claim that the mild-mannered Hirohito, no less than the European dictators was a major cause of war. After all, the Meiji constitution, the fundamental law of Japan after 1889, was handed down by the emperor who remained, according to the founding myths, the source of legitimate authority, the embodiment of sovereignty, and the sanctions of laws. He appointed the prime minister and other top officials of state. He could alter the bureaucracy, convene the Diet (national assembly), declare war, make peace, conclude treaties, and confer ranks and honors. More than this, he was the object of awe and reverence an attitude reinforced by the cult of state Shinto which perpetuated the concept that through the emperor the Japanese people had contact with eternity. Finally, and as it turned out most importantly, the emperor according to the Meiji constitution was military commander-in-chief.

The most persuasive historical scholarship has revealed, however, that unlike the leaders of his European allies, Germany and Italy, the Japanese emperor exercised little power. The last Japanese emperor who wielded power died in 1333. Emperor Go Daigo who succeeded him, failed to establish leadership. Over five hundred years later the Meiji constitution gave certain powers to the emperor but limited his actions. He could exercise no power on his own. He was constrained by a series of checks, including the need to obtain the signatures of his ministers on decrees and an annual budget that was approved by a regent. Another emperor, Taisho, (1912 to 1926) was mentally handicapped.

In the words of Japan specialist and former U.S. Ambassador to the country, Edwin O. Reischauer, "all power stemmed from him but he exercised no

power." Instead, various groups rose to ascendancy by claiming to speak for him. They included at various times high officials of the court; Diet politicians; extreme nationalists; intellectuals, including proponents of the theory that the emperor was an organ of the constitution; and finally, in the period between 1931 and 1945, the military and their allies in government who avoided accountability through their prerogative, guaranteed by the Meiji constitution, of direct access to the emperor. Cabinet ministers received their appointments from elder statesmen who surrounded the emperor, from consensus of the party in power, or after the early 1930s, from the military. The tradition was immemorial, said one historian, that the Japanese government "never approached the Throne with a problem until the government's own solution to the problem was unanimous. The emperor himself neither took sides nor stated his opinion: he merely approved what the government has already decided." Accordingly, the responsibility for "decision made and actions taken was never his." If a cabinet could not reach unanimity, it resigned. Unfortunately, the cabinet of General Hideki Tojo reached a consensus for war, and the emperor had no choice but to go along.

The nature of the institution within such abuses occurred appeared in a statement by Ashida Hitoshi, chairman of the constitutional amendments committee of the lower house of the Diet and one of those who accepted the postwar constitution. The emperor, he said, "on the basis of the sovereign will of the people unifies them coevally with Heaven and Earth, from eternity to eternity...while being in the midst of the people, stands outside the pale of actual politics, and still maintains his authority as the center of the life of the people and as the source of spiritual guidance." General MacArthur and his staff could accept the essential institution both took care that neither sovereignty nor powers related to government would be exercised by anyone other than elected officials. The cabinet was responsible in matters of state. The abolition of state Shinto removed another source of control in the emperor's name. Turning over his personal finances to the Diet

diminished his economic autonomy. Finally, Japan was not allowed to develop offensive military forces. It was thus not the emperor's own power but a system in which others, for their own purposes and aggrandizement, ruled in his name that the postwar constitution brought to an end.

The contrast between the Showa emperor's personal powerlessness of the Japanese emperor in the years preceding the outbreak of war in December, 1941. This disparity appeared first in 1928 when the emperor asked the prime minister to discipline the officers who were behind the plot that resulted in the murder of the Chinese leader of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin. The army minister refused and the prime minister conceded there was nothing he could do to carry out the order. In the chaotic years that followed both the government and the emperor were under the pressure. There were four attempts by ultra-nationalist elements in the military, acting either without authority from the emperor or against his wishes, to take over the government. In one of these the prime minister was killed. In another, in February 26, 1936, the lord keeper of the privy seal, the finance minister, and the inspector general of education were assassinated. As late as October 17, 1941, Tojo, upon taking office as prime minister, decided to retain the posts of both war and home affairs minister to assist him in controlling army opposition if Japan accepted American conditions for avoiding war.

The emperor was sceptical of the actions being taken in his name during this period. He sought to prevent the use of force. In 1931 he told the prime minister on September 23 he opposed extension of hostilities to Manchuria. Unfortunately, the cabinet already had given approval. At the time of the Tripartite Pact in September, 1940, the emperor said "an America war seemed unavoidable and Japan might be

defeated." He considered the "Guidelines for Implementing National Policies" adopted on September 6, 1941, as a last effort to "avoid war through negotiations." The military took the opposite views, considering them instead the signal for war. The emperor expressed doubts as late as November 29 and resigned himself to war only after being assured that Japanese armed forces were prepared to fight even if Germany withdrew. One American historian was critical, characterizing the emperor during World War II as a "young, vigorous, well-informed monarch who possessed real power, often made his preferences known, and actively allowed himself to be turned into the central icon of Japanese ultra-nationalism." This historian cited no examples, however, and admitted that "we will never know exactly what he {the emperor} did or did not do between 1926 and 1945." Another historian was more persuasive when he said, "no evidence exists that the emperor was the culprit." Matsudaira, secretary to the keeper of the privy seal, affirmed this view, recalling only two times allusively. The first was his denunciation of the February 26, 1936 incident. The second was his decision to accept the Potsdam declaration on August 9, 1945. At all other times, said the former imperial assistant, Hirohito could do no more than simply "wish, advise, or suggest."

The evidence now available supports the claim that Japan embarked upon a path of aggression in the 1930s but not that the emperor led it. Political and military leaders in the cabinet, not the emperor, made and carried out policy. Hirohito had made mistakes perhaps, but when he could, he moved forward to terminate what had become a disaster. National ruin, Soviet entry into the war, and American willingness, after exploding two atomic bombs, to acknowledge his existence brought his intervention to bring surrender. In keeping with his position as ceremonial representative of this country, he accepted responsibility

and apologized for it. Since he neither possessed nor wanted the authority the militarists claimed for themselves in his name, he willingly renounced his divinity, donned civilian clothes, and turned to his congenial vocation of marine biology and pastimes of watching television and walking with his wife on the palace grounds.

The lessons of World War II in the Pacific are many. But the guilt of the emperor is not one of them. One finds instead the hazard of government in which unrestrained political power belongs to one group with support from the military. Still another is the failure of both Japan's government, those individuals with the responsibility and authority, and the governments of the nations that failed to stop the aggression of the 1930s.

(Fulbright visiting Professor, Nanzan University)

編集者注記：紙面の都合で脚注の部分を省略しましたので、完全なペーパーをご希望の方は直接ビケットさんに請求してください。